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In a standard financial market model with asymmetric information with a finite number N of 
risk-averse informed traders, competitive rational expectations equilibria provide a good 
approximation to strategic equilibria as long as N is not too small: equilibrium prices in each 
situation converge to each other at a rate of 1/N as the market becomes large. The 
approximation is particularly good when the informationally adjusted risk bearing capacity of 
traders is not very large. This is not the case if informed traders are close to risk neutral. Both 
equilibria converge to the competitive equilibrium of an idealized limit continuum economy 
as the market becomes large at a slower rate of 1/√N and, therefore, the limit equilibrium need 
not be a good approximation of the strategic equilibrium in moderately large markets. 
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The aim of this paper is to nd out when we can safely use competitive rational expectations
equilibria (REE) as an approximation of the \true" strategic equilibria in a standard nancial
market context. We would like to bound the error when approximating the equilibrium with a
nite number of traders with a price-taking equilibrium, as is often done in applied work. The
general result is that the competitive approximation basically works, even in a moderately
sized market, when competitive traders have incentives to be restrained in their trading.
The concept of competitive REE has been questioned from dierent quarters. Hellwig
(1980) pointed out the \schizophrenia" problem of price-taking behavior in a competitive
REE with a nite number of traders. When submitting their demands traders would take
into account the information content of the price but not the price impact of their trade.
The problem disappears in a large market. Indeed, as the market becomes large the strategic
equilibria of nite economies converge to the competitive REE of an idealized limit continuum
economy (as described, e.g., by Admati (1985) or Vives (1995)). Kyle (1989) modeled the
strategic equilibrium directly where traders are aware of the price impact of their trades and
compete in demand schedules (in a REE with imperfect competition) and claimed that the
properties of the imperfect competition model were reasonable.
In this paper we show, in the framework of Kyle's (1989) model, that the competitive REE
of a large but nite market with risk-averse traders provides a good approximation of the
\true" strategic equilibrium. This is particularly the case when the informationally adjusted
risk-bearing capacity of traders is not very large. Then, if the market has a minimum size,
we can take the shortcut of assuming competitive behavior of the nite number of agents
present as a good enough approximation. That is, we can use competitive REE without
apology. However, the shortcut does not work, for example, if informed traders are close to
risk neutral. In any case the strategic equilibrium is not well approximated by the competitive
REE of the idealized limit continuum economy.
Consider the imperfect competition model of Kyle (1989) with risk-averse speculators,
parameterize the size of the market by the volume of noise trading z and let there be
free entry of speculators. As in Verrecchia (1982) and Kyle (1989) speculators can become
informed, acquiring a private signal of known precision, by paying a xed cost, which may
depend on the size of the market. The entry of uninformed speculators is free. We show rst
that, if the entry cost in a large market is positive but not too large, the equilibrium number
of informed speculators N is of the order of z, that is, N grows in proportion to z, in both
the strategic and competitive cases. We can then identify increases in the size of the market
z with increases in N. This is our central scenario. The result is that the equilibrium prices
in the strategic and competitive cases, as the market becomes large, converge to each other at
a rate of 1=N, while both converge to the competitive equilibrium of the limit economy at a
rate of 1=
p
N. The same rates of convergence apply for demands, prots and relative utilities
1of traders. The consequence is that in moderately sized and large markets the assumption
of competitive behavior with risk-averse traders turns out to be a good approximation to
the \true" strategic (Bayesian) equilibrium. However, thinking in terms of the idealized
continuum limit economy will not provide a good approximation for the equilibrium of the
nite market. The point is that market power is dissipated quickly, at a rate of 1=N, while
the distance between a nite and the limit economy depends on the rate at which the average
error term in the signals of traders vanishes, and this is 1=
p
N.
The result that market power vanishes quickly at a rate of 1=N as the market grows
is consistent with the result obtained by Vives (2002) in the context of a Cournot model
(which in the nancial market would correspond to traders using market orders instead of
demand schedules as in Kyle's (1989) model) and with Gong and McAfee (1996) for double
auctions allowing correlated values (the discrepancy of the strategic equilibrium, Bayesian
bidding equilibrium at the double auction, and the non-strategic price-taking equilibrium
bid is of the order of 1=N).1 Our results are also related to the literature that tries to
provide a strategic foundation for competitive REE in a continuum economy. This is the
aim, for example, of Reny and Perry (2006). They consider a double auction with a nite
number of buyers and sellers with interdependent values and aliated private information,
and show that if there are suciently many buyers and sellers (and their bids are restricted
to a suciently ne discrete set of prices), then generically there exists an equilibrium which
is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing REE of the limit market. In particular, the
double auction equilibrium is almost ecient in large economies (but they do not analyze
convergence rates). In our model a large number of traders are needed for the equilibrium
in the continuum economy to be a good approximation of the strategic equilibrium since the
rate of convergence is 1=
p
N.
We also look at a more rened measure of convergence speed for a given rate of con-
vergence: the asymptotic variance of the price dierence in the dierent regimes. We nd
that the asymptotic variance of the price dierence between the strategic and the competi-
tive regime in a nite economy is small, and the approximation of the strategic equilibrium
by the competitive equilibrium is good, when the prior volatility of the asset is low, noise
trading is large in relation to the risk bearing capacity of the informed traders, or the signals
are very noisy.2 We conrm, therefore, the idea that the competitive approximation works,
even in a moderately sized market, basically when competitive traders have incentives to
be restrained in their trading. As traders become less and less risk averse, the asymptotic
1The latter paper extends the work on independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) double auction
environments of Rustichini et al. (1994) to general information structures. Other extensions are provided
by Cripps and Swinkels (2006). Yosha (1997) deals with nancial intermediation in a large Cournot{Walras
economy with i.i.d. shocks and computes the rates of convergence as the economy becomes large for various
market parameters.
2However, while the asymptotic variance of the price dierence between the strategic and the competitive
regime is increasing in the volatility of fundamentals, it can be nonmonotonic in the volume of noise trading
and the degree of risk aversion, and it is always nonmonotonic in the noisiness of the signals.
2variance of the price dierence between the strategic and the competitive regime in a nite
economy increases unboundedly, reecting the fact that when traders are close to risk neutral,
competitive prices are close to being fully revealing while prices at the strategic equilibrium
are far from being so. This points to the fact that the competitive model is appropriate, as
an approximation to the true strategic model, when traders are risk averse but not when they
are close to risk neutral. In fact, when they are close to risk neutral and information is costly
to acquire, no competitive traders would enter into the market and become informed because
they would lose money (this is just a variant of the well-known Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
paradox). Indeed, the naive idea that with risk-neutral traders Bertrand competition would
push the strategic and competitive regimes closer together does not hold. This is consistent
with the results in Biais et al. (2000) according to which adverse selection softens supply
schedule competition among risk-neutral market makers in a common value environment.
We also test the limits of our results by checking situations where the number of informed
traders increases nonproportionally to the size of the market. If the number of informed
traders increases faster than the size of the market, then a fully revealing equilibrium is
obtained in the limit. If the number of informed traders increases more slowly than the size
of the market, then an informationally trivial equilibrium is obtained in the limit. In all
cases, market power is again dissipated faster than the rate at which the nite and the limit
economy converge to each other as the market becomes large.
Finally, we look at a version of Kyle's (1989) \monopolistic competition case" where
the competitive market need not be a good approximation of strategic trading even in a
large market. This occurs when the cost of acquiring information tends to zero but the
total precision of information for the informed is bounded. In this context traders retain
some market power even in a large market. In this case convergence to the monopolistically
competitive limit as the information purchase cost tends to zero occurs at most at a rate of
1=N. Therefore, our results on the approximation of strategic by competitive equilibria have
to be qualied as holding in those situations where there is no residual market power in a
large market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the structure
of the model and the equilibria that we are going to consider with a xed number of informed
speculators. In Section 3 we endogenize the number of informed speculators in a free entry
model and provide a characterization of equilibria. The results on the speed of convergence to
price-taking equilibria in the central scenario are presented in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted
to the analysis of convergence in other large market scenarios. In section 6 we address
traders who are almost risk neutral. In Section 7 we present the monopolistic competition
case. Proofs of all the results are collected in the Appendix.
32 A market with N informed speculators
Consider Kyle's (1989) model (and to facilitate comparison we follow his notation as closely
as possible). A single risky asset with random liquidation value ~ v is traded among noise
traders, N informed speculators, indexed n = 1;:::;N, and market makers.3 The return to
trade one unit at a market clearing price ~ p is thus ~ v  ~ p. Noise traders trade in the aggregate
the random quantity ~ z. Each informed speculator n = 1;:::;N receives a private signal
~ {n = ~ v + ~ en, where the random variables ~ v; ~ z; ~ e1;:::; ~ eN are assumed to be normally and
independently distributed with zero means and variances given by var[~ v] =  1
v , var[~ z] = 2
z,
var[~ en] =  1
e .4
Speculators compete in demand schedules and have constant absolute risk-aversion utility
functions with coecient  > 0 and a (normalized) zero initial endowment of the risky asset.
Speculator n chooses a demand schedule Xn(;in) which depends on his signal in and, given
the market clearing price p, derives utility
Un(n) =  exp( n) where n = (v   p)xn and xn = Xn(p;in):
Market makers are uninformed and make their trade based only on public information
transmitted through the price. We assume that there is a competitive risk-neutral market
making sector that induces semi-strong ecient pricing:
E [~ v j ~ p] = ~ p:
This may arise because uninformed traders are risk neutral or because there is costless free
entry of uninformed speculators (as we will see in the next section).
Strategic and competitive equilibria Two equilibria are considered. The rst is a com-
petitive REE and the second is Kyle's REE with imperfect competition. The second is simply
a Bayesian equilibrium in demand schedules of the game among the N informed traders. The
rst is also a Bayesian equilibrium, but now each informed trader, when considering what
demand schedule to use, does not take into account the impact of his choice on the market
price.
We concentrate attention on symmetric linear equilibria, that is, an equilibrium in which
the strategies for each trader Xn, n = 1;:::;N, are identical ane functions. Thus, there
exist constants ;; such that a strategy Xn can be written
Xn(p;in) =  + in   p:
3A tilde distinguishes between a random variable and its realization.
4The assumption E [~ v] = E [~ en] = 0 is made without loss of generality. The assumption E [~ z] = 0 does not
aect the results in this paper.
4Theorem 5.1 in Kyle (1989) implies that for 2
z > 0 and e > 0 there exists a unique
symmetric linear REE with imperfect competition for any N. That is, there is a symmetric
linear equilibrium and this equilibrium is unique in the class of symmetric linear equilibria.
Theorem 6.1 in Kyle (1989) provides a corresponding result on the existence and uniqueness
of a symmetric linear competitive REE.
We use a superscript c to denote the values associated with a competitive equilibrium;
values associated with a strategic equilibrium do not have this superscript. Subscript N
(respectively, subscript 1) corresponds to the values of the market with N (respectively,
with an innite number of) informed traders.
3 Free entry in a large market
Consider the following scenario in which we endogenize the number of informed speculators.
There are two stages and a countable innity of potential traders. In a rst stage any trader
(except noise traders) can become informed (that is, can receive a signal about the value of
the asset) by paying a xed amount F > 0. In a second stage the speculators that have
decided to enter compete as in the previous section to make money out of the noise traders.
Free entry of uninformed speculators, even if they are risk averse, implies that the market at
the second stage is semi-strong ecient (Theorem 7.4 in Kyle (1989)).5
The size of the market is naturally parameterized by the noise trading volume z. We
also index the cost of acquiring information by z : F(z). If F() is constant there are
constant returns to information acquisition. If F() is increasing (decreasing) in the size
of the market there are decreasing (increasing) returns to scale to information acquisition.
Increasing returns to information production may arise because of xed costs in information
production and decreasing returns may arise because of increased correlation among signals





The equilibrium number of informed traders is determined as follows. Consider rst the
strategic case. Let ~ N be the equilibrium random prots of an informed speculator when
N have entered and denote by (N) the certainty equivalent of prots that makes a trader
indierent between making this payment to be one of the informed speculators or remain
uninformed. We have that, because of exponential utility, (N) is independent of initial
wealth and
 exp( (N)) = E[ exp( ~ N)]:
5Alternatively, we may assume that at the second stage there is a competitive risk-neutral market making
sector and then no risk-averse trader will choose to enter if he does not purchase information.
5Let N(z) denote the equilibrium number of informed speculators in the imperfect com-
petition model when noise trading has standard deviation z. Here N(z) is dened as the
largest N such that
(N)  F(z):
Let us dene the competitive equilibrium model c(N) and N
c(z) similarly. Then the
equilibrium number of speculators N
c(z) is dened as the largest N such that
c(N)  F(z):
Then, as is shown in Kyle (1989, Theorems 10.1 and 10.2), there is a unique free-entry
equilibrium of the two-stage game in both the strategic and competitive cases.
We are interested in the rate of change of the equilibrium number of entrants in both the
competitive and the strategic regime as the market becomes large by increasing
p
var[~ z] = z.
For all of the markets var[~ v] =  1
v and var[~ en] =  1
e are xed constants.
We say that a market with equilibrium price ~ p is (i) value revealing if ~ p = ~ v (almost
surely); (ii) informationally trivial if var 1 [~ v j ~ p] = var 1 [~ v] = v. It is easy to see that in
case (ii), necessarily, ~ p = E [~ v] = 0 (almost surely).6
Notation for the comparison of rates of convergence We use the following notation
to make comparisons of the rates of convergence. For two functions f;g : Z+ ! R we have:
(i) f  O(g) means that there exist an integer N0 and a positive constant k such that
jf(N)j  kjg(N)j for any N  N0; that is, jfj grows \at a rate not larger" than jgj as
N ! 1;
(ii) f  o(g) means that limN!1(f(N)=g(N)) = 0; that is, jfj grows \at a smaller rate"
than jgj as N ! 1;
(iii) f / g means that f  O(g) and g  O(f); that is, jfj grows \at the same rate" as jgj
when N ! 1.
Our rst result shows what cases arise depending on the value of F(1).











6Indeed, from E [~ v j ~ p] = ~ p we have that E [~ p] = E [E [~ v j ~ p]] = E [~ v] = 0. Since var[~ v] = E [var[~ v j ~ p]] +
var[E [~ v j ~ p]], we have that E [var[~ v j ~ p]] = E [var[~ v]] = var[~ v] and var[E [~ v j ~ p]] = var[~ p] and therefore it
should be that var[~ p] = 0.
6In a large market three cases appear (in both the strategic and competitive cases) in a free
entry equilibrium as z ! 1.
1. If F(1)  F, then if the endogenous number of informed speculators grows, it grows
at a slower rate than z (N
c(z) and N(z) are  o(z)). The limit market is infor-
mationally trivial and the prices converge to zero.
2. If 0 < F(1) < F, then the endogenous number of informed speculators grows propor-
tionally to z (N
c(z) / N(z) / z). The limit market is neither value revealing nor
informationally trivial.
3. If F(1) = 0, then the endogenous number of informed speculators grows at a faster
rate than z (z  o(N
c(z)) and z  o(N(z)). The limit market is value revealing:
the prices converge to ~ v.
The limit market in case (2) corresponds to the continuum of traders competitive model
of Vives (1995) where informed traders co-exist with risk neutral market makers. The com-
petitive models of Hellwig (1980) and Admati (1985) do not have risk neutral market makers.
The result is also consistent with related work by Garc a and Urosevic (2008) (where they
also nd a limit of the Vives (1995) type corresponding to their case of "diversiable noise".)
Remark 1. In the case of constant returns to information acquisition, F()  F:
1. if F  F, then N
c(z) = N(z) = 0;
2. if 0 < F < F, then N
c(z) / N(z) / z;
3. if F = 0, then N
c(z) = N(z) = 1.
The proofs of all results are collected together in the Appendix. Let us present here a
sketch of the argument.
An heuristic explanation of the proof Consider rst the strategic case for an exogenous
number of speculators N. It is easy to see that the certainty equivalent of prots (N) is











Then it is shown that (N) converges as z ! 1 to dierent limits depending on the rate
of the growth of N:
(i) if N grows at a slower rate than z, then relatively few informed speculators are in
the market, the limit market is informationally trivial, and the certainty equivalent of
prots (N) converges to its upper bound F (information is the most valuable);
7(ii) if N grows at the same rate as z, then the limit market is neither value revealing nor
informationally trivial, and the certainty equivalent of prots (N) for large N belongs
to some interval strictly between 0 and F (information is valuable);
(iii) if N grows at a faster rate than z, then relatively many speculators are in the market,
the limit market is value revealing and the certainty equivalent of prots (N) converges
to 0 (information is not valuable).
Allow now for an endogenous number of speculators N. If N does not grow unboundedly
as z ! 1, then we should be in the case (i) above and F(1)  F (with no speculators
becoming informed when F()  F). If N grows unboundedly as z ! 1 then it should
be that (N) ! F(1). (For a given z speculators will enter until (N) is just above
F(1).) Depending on the value of F(1) we should be in one of the cases (i){(iii) above.
If F(1)  F, then we must be in case (i) since eventually it does not pay to become
informed. If F(1) = 0, then eventually all speculators enter and we must be in case (iii). If
0 < F(1) < F, then N must grow unboundedly with z and (N) ! F(1) (otherwise,
(N) ! F and there would be more entry since F(1) < F). It follows that we must be
in case (ii) since if N grows at a faster rate than z, then (N) ! 0, and if N grows at a
slower rate than z, then (N) ! F. We can show in this case that z=N(z) ! z0 as
z ! 1 for some constant z0 inversely related to F(1).
For the price-taking equilibrium the analysis is similar but based on c(N).
Hence, in general, for the whole range of intermediate values of F(1) we obtain that
the endogenous number of informed speculators is proportional to the standard deviation of
the noise trade and this is the case that has as its limit the usual continuum model. Thus,
it is natural to consider sequences of markets where the numbers of informed speculators
are proportional to z. In the next section we restrict our attention to such sequences of
markets. After the presentation of our main results, we present some complementary results
for dierent sequences of markets in the following sections.
4 Convergence to price-taking in the central scenario
Let us consider the following sequence of markets indexed by N. At the Nth market there are
N informed agents. In all of the markets var[~ v] =  1
v and var[~ en] =  1
e are xed constants.
Let ~ z(N) = N~ z0 and var[~ z0] = 2
z0; where 2
z0 is a constant. That is, the standard deviation
of the noise trade z grows at a rate of N.
As N grows we know that the strategic and competitive equilibria tend to each other
(from Theorem 9.2 in Kyle (1989)) and that they both tend to the competitive equilibrium
of the limit continuum economy (as in Hellwig (1980), Admati (1985) or Vives (1995)). We
now characterize the rate at which strategic and competitive equilibria tend to each other
and the rate at which they tend to the competitive equilibrium of the limit economy.
8Convergence concepts To compare rates of convergence of random variables we use the
square loss function. We say that two random variables x, y converge to each other at some
rate if
p




= (E [x]   E [y])2 + var[x   y];
and that if E [x] = E [y], then E

(x   y)2
= var[x   y].
A more rened measure of convergence speed for a given convergence rate is provided by
the asymptotic standard deviation. Suppose that
p
E [(xN   yN)2] =
p
var[xN   yN] con-
verges to zero at a rate of 1=N for some  > 0 (that is,
p
var[xN   yN] / 1=N), then the
asymptotic standard deviation of convergence is given by the constant limN!1 Np
var[xN   yN].
A higher asymptotic standard deviation means that the speed of convergence is slower.
4.1 Prices
In order to compare convergence rates for prices consider the following decomposition:
~ pN   ~ p1 = (~ pN   ~ pc
N) + (~ pc
N   ~ p1):
The rst term of the decomposition captures the dierence between equilibrium prices for
the price-taking ~ pc
N and strategic equilibria ~ pN in the same nite market. The second term




(~ pN   ~ p1)2
= E






N   ~ p1)2
+ 2Cov[~ pN   ~ pc
N; ~ pc
N   ~ p1]
will be of the order of the higher order term. Using H older's inequality (see, e.g., Royden
(1968, p. 113)) we obtain that
Cov[~ pN   ~ pc
N; ~ pc









N   ~ p1)21=2 ;
and therefore the interaction covariance term will be of lower order than the higher-order
term of E






N   ~ p1)2
. The term E

(~ pN   ~ pc
N)2
corresponds to the
strategic eect and the term E

(~ pc
N   ~ p1)2
corresponds to the limit eect.
We show in the next result that E

(~ pN   ~ pc
N)2
converges to zero faster than E

(~ pc
N   ~ p1)2
and therefore E

(~ pN   ~ p1)2
inherits the order of E

(~ pc
N   ~ p1)2
(they both converge to
zero at exactly the same speed).
Given competitive market making, the expectations of the dierences in equilibrium prices
vanish and we need to compare only the rates of convergence of variances.

































E [(~ pN   ~ p1)2] =
p
var[~ pN   ~ p1] / 1=
p
N.
The formal proof is given in the Appendix. Let us present here an informal explanation
of the result.
An heuristic explanation The demand of an informed trader at a strategic equilibrium
is given by
Xn(~ p;~ {n) =
E[~ v j ~ p;~ {n]   ~ p
var[~ v j ~ p;~ {n] + I
;
where I is the slope of inverse supply facing the individual informed trader. In the compet-
itive case I = 0. It is easy to check7 that I is of the order of 1=N and this explains why
market power vanishes at the rate 1=N. (Result 1 in Proposition 2.)
In a symmetric linear equilibrium, prices have the following form:
~ pc
N = Ac






~ en + Cc
N~ z0;





~ en + CN~ z0;
~ p1 = A1~ v + C1~ z0:
We have that Ac
N and AN converge to A1; Bc
N and BN converge to B1 6= 0 and Cc
N and CN
converge to C1, all at a rate of 1=N or faster. Since we have assumed that E [~ v] = E [~ en] =
E [~ z] = 0 expectations of prices are simply zeros (in fact, the expectations of price dierences
would be zero even if E [~ v] > 0 because E [~ pc
N] = E [~ pN] = E [~ v] from p = E [v j p] in both
cases). Therefore, only variances of the price dierences are important:
var[~ pN   ~ pc
N] = (AN   Ac
N)2 1

















var[~ pN   ~ p1] = (AN   A1)2 1
v + (BN)2 1
N
 1
e + (CN   C1)22
z0 / 1=N:
Thus, ~ pc
N and ~ pN converge to each other faster than to the limit price ~ p1 (at the rate at which
market power vanishes) because prices in the nite markets depend in a similar way on the
7Conditions (B.8) and (B.9) in Kyle (1989) imply that I = I=((1   I)) where the parameter I can
be interpreted as the marginal market share of an informed trader. We have then that I / I / 1=N (see
Lemma 3 in the Appendix).
10average noise in private information (1=N)
PN
n=1 ~ en, while in the continuum limit market the
average noise of information cancels out according to the Strong Law of Large Numbers. The
distance from ~ pc
N (or ~ pN) to the limit price ~ p1 depends on (1=N)
PN
n=1 ~ en and this average
error term converges to zero at a rate of 1=
p
N. (Results 2 and 3 in Proposition 2.) It is
worth to remark that the limit eect would disappear if all informed traders were to receive
the same signal (indeed, then ~ pc
N = ~ p1).
Asymptotic variances of convergence Note also that in Proposition 2 we actually show
slightly more than in the above heuristic argument. Namely, we prove that ~ pN and ~ pc
N
converge to each other precisely at the rate 1=N. We can also characterize the asymptotic
variances of convergence. Those gives us a rened measure of the speed of convergence for a
given convergence rate.
Proposition 3. Let AL denote the asymptotic standard deviation of the limit eect and AS





var[~ pN   ~ pc










































The following comparative statics results are immediate.
(1) AL monotonically decreases in the precision of the prior v. If v ! 0+, then AL !
1=
p
e. If v ! +1, then AL ! 0. This result is quite intuitive. The lower the variance
of the value of the asset, the faster equilibrium prices converge to the limit.
(2) AL monotonically decreases in \risk-bearing adjusted noise trade" z0. If z0 ! 0+,
then AL ! 1=
p
e. If z0 ! +1, then AL ! 0. The fact that AL decreases in z0
may seem surprising. How can it be that more noise trading or a higher degree of
risk aversion improve the convergence to the limit price? However, recall that a term
corresponding to the average information noise in the nite market ((1=N)
PN
n=1 ~ en)
determines the convergence to the limit price. The more traders are risk averse the
less weight they put on their signals and the less information noise is incorporated into
11the equilibrium price. Similarly, the larger noise trading is the smaller the information
noise portion incorporated into the equilibrium price. Thus, an increase in z0 causes
a decrease in the amount of information noise incorporated into the price and therefore
decreases the asymptotic variance of the limit eect.
(3) AL is always nonmonotonic in the precision of the signal e. If e ! 0+ or if e !
+1, then AL ! 0. Actually, AL is increasing for e < z0
p
3v and decreasing for
e > z0
p
3v. At e = z0
p
3v, AL reaches a maximum. Thus, if signals become
very informative or very noisy, then AL becomes arbitrary small and equilibrium prices
converge to the limit faster. Indeed, in both cases the average noise in the signals does
not matter much in determining the price in a nite market: when signals are very
noisy traders put very little weight on them, and when they are very precise signal
noise is very small.



























The following comparative statics results are immediate.
(1) AS monotonically decreases in v. If v ! 0+ then AS ! (z0) 1 +  1
e (z0). If
v ! +1 then AS ! 0. Again, the lower the variance of the value of the asset is, the
faster the strategic eect disappears.
(2) AS either monotonically decreases or is nonmonotonic in z0 depending on other pa-
rameters. (For example, if e = 1 and v = 1, then AS monotonically decreases in
z0. However, if e = 1 and v = 0:01, then for z0 = 0:5 we obtain AS = 2:49; for
z0 = 1 we obtain AS = 1:97; and for z0 = 2 we obtain AS = 2:33.) Furthermore, if
z0 ! 0+, then AS ! +1. If z0 ! +1, then AS ! 0. If the noise trading is small
for the risk-bearing capacity of the informed traders, then the strategic eect disappears
more slowly. In fact, with risk neutrality competitive prices become fully revealing and
the strategic and competitive equilibria converge to each other at a slower rate than









N as ~ pc
N
! ~ v for  ! 0. If the noise trade is large for the risk-bearing capacity of the informed
traders the opposite happens (AS ! 0).
(3) AS is always nonmonotonic in e. In general, the behavior of AS is very complicated.






























Then Q is monotonically increasing in e. However, R is increasing in e for e <
z0
p
v and R is decreasing for e > z0
p
v. If e ! 0+, then Q ! 0 and R ! 1,
so AS ! 0. Clearly, AS is increasing in e for e < z0
p
v. If e ! +1, then Q
increases to the value of (z0) 1 in the limit (and it reaches the limiting value at the
rate 1=2
e). However, if e ! +1, then R is decreasing to the value of 1 in the limit.
Function R reaches the limiting value at the rate 1=e. Therefore if e ! +1, then
AS ! (z0) 1 and AS is decreasing in e. (Alternatively, one can check directly that
the sign of the derivative of AS is negative for e ! +1.)
At e = z0
p
v, R reaches a maximum of (1 + z0=
p
v) while Q = 1=(2z0).



















Thus, if signals are very noisy, then AS (as AL) becomes arbitrary small. For signals
that are very informative AS reaches some positive number (while AL becomes arbitrary
small). The dierence in the behavior of the two asymptotic variances is again a result
of the fact that it is not only the information noise that is a factor for the strategic
eect.




z0. For practical purposes the limit eect will dominate the
strategic one whenever AL=
p












In summary, we have that AS is small, and the approximation of the strategic equilib-
rium by the competitive equilibrium good, when the prior volatility of the asset is low,
noise trading is large in relation to the risk-bearing capacity of the informed traders,
or the signals are very noisy. We conrm, therefore, the idea that the competitive
approximation works even in a moderately sized market when the informationally ad-
justed risk-bearing capacity of the informed traders is not very large (i.e. basically when
competitive traders have incentives to be restrained in their trading).
134.1.2 Values for stock markets
Let us compute the asymptotic variances for some reasonable values of the parameters in a
stock market. Let  = 2 and
p
var[~ z0] = z0 = 0:1. For the volatility of the fundamentals let
us consider two cases: (i)
p
var[~ v] = 
 1=2
v = 0:2 (NYSE type) or (ii)
p
var[~ v] = 
 1=2
v = 0:6
(Nasdaq type). These parameters are chosen to reect average market data. (See Table 1 in
Leland (1992).)
Table 1 presents results for
p
var[~ en] = 
 1=2
e ranging from 0:05 to 20. It is immediate
from this table that both AS and AL are nonmonotonic in e. Table 1 is consistent with the
statements that AS and AL are decreasing in v and that AS and AL converge to zero as e !
0. For large e, as predicted, AL converges to zero, while AS converges to 1=(z0) = 5. The
standard deviation of the distance between the strategic and competitive price
p
var[~ pN   ~ pc
N]
is approximated by AS=N. We see that in all scenarios this standard deviation is quite small






v 0.05 0.1 0.5 1 5 10 20
0.2 AS 5.0005 5.0015 4.7502 2.5500 0.0080 0.0005 0.0000
AL 0.0500 0.1000 0.4706 0.5000 0.0080 0.0009 0.0001
0.6 AS 5.0005 5.0019 5.0148 4.6620 0.0720 0.0045 0.0003
AL 0.0500 0.1000 0.4966 0.9000 0.0710 0.0090 0.0011
Table 1: Values for AS and AL:
Values for S&P 500 Futures market In a recent paper Cho and Krishnan (2000) ad-
dressed the S&P 500 Futures market. They found that a competitive rational expectations
model provides a reasonable description of this market and present estimates of the primitive
parameters of the model (in Table 2 of their paper): the standard deviation of the fundamen-
tals at
p
var[~ v] = 
 1=2
v = 5:495; and for other parameters (z0 and
p
var[~ en] = 
 1=2
e ) they
presented results, which are summarized in Table 2 together with the corresponding values
of the asymptotic standard deviations AS and AL, that dier in the number of the weeks to
maturity (from 2 to 7).
Time to maturity (weeks)
2 3 4 5 6 7
z0 0.021 0.007 0.045 0.038 0.030 0.029

 1=2
e 12.541 23.358 10.067 12.925 17.263 20.705
AS 36.76 98.06 14.76 12.44 9.81 5.97
AL 9.21 15.75 5.96 5.54 4.73 3.38
Table 2: Summary of results (Cho and Krishnan (2000)).
14The S&P 500 Futures market has high volatility, very noisy information signals and
relatively small noise trade. In this context the asymptotic variances are larger than with
the stock market parameters. However, since the number of traders in the S&P 500 Futures
market is very large, the competitive REE should be a very close approximation of the
strategic REE in this market. In the analysis of S&P 500 Futures market one can safely take
the shortcut of assuming competitive behavior.
4.2 Demands, prots and utilities
We now study the convergence rates for demands, prots and utilities. For all of these we
conrm the result that the strategic eect is of the order of 1=N while the limit eect is of
the order of 1=
p
N. The rst of these results addresses demands.

































E [(~ xN   ~ x1)2] =
p
var[~ xN   ~ x1] / 1=
p
N.
As for prices, the expectations of all demands are zero, so these square loss functions
simply are the variances of the dierences between corresponding demands. Since demands
are linear functions of prices, the same eect holding for prices should hold in terms of
demands.
Our next proposition demonstrates a similar conclusion for the prots of the traders.



















E [(~ N   ~ 1)2] / 1=
p
N.
For prots, unlike for prices or demands, expectations of dierences do not vanish, so
we cannot restrict attention only to the variances but rather we have to consider the entire
square loss functions.
Finally, we consider relative changes in utilities.



















E [(U(~ N)=U(~ 1)   1)2] / 1=
p
N.
Similarly to prots, utilities have non-zero expectations.
5 Convergence in other scenarios
In this section we consider how our results are aected if the number of informed speculators
does not change proportionally to noise trading. As we have seen above, two dierent limit
cases can emerge. We consider them separately.
5.1 Fully revealing limit
We have seen that if the number of informed speculators grows at a faster rate than noise
trading, a value revealing limit is obtained. Let us study the convergence rates in two cases:
First, when z grows slower than a rate N but faster than a rate
p
N; second, when z grows
at a rate
p
N or slower. The following propositions provide the results.
Proposition 7. For a sequence of markets with z growing slower than at the rate N but





















var[~ pN   ~ v] / z(N)=N.
Therefore, since 1=z(N) = (z(N)=N)(N=2
z(N))  o(z(N)=N), the strategic eect
vanishes faster than the limit eect as in our central scenario.
The reader may notice that if z(N) grows almost at a rate
p
N, then in Proposition 7
the strategic eect is almost of the same order as the limit eect. The next proposition shows
that if z(N) grows at a rate
p
N, then the rate of convergence is 1=
p
N, but the strategic
eect is still dominated by the limit eect if one considers the asymptotic variances.









































var[~ pN   ~ v].
Part 2 of Proposition 8 shows that, in terms of asymptotic variances, ~ pc
N converges to ~ pN
faster than ~ pN converges to ~ v. So ~ pc
N is a better proxy than ~ v for ~ pN. Moreover, Part 3 of
Proposition 8 demonstrates that in terms of asymptotic variances ~ pc
N converges to ~ v faster
than ~ pN converges to ~ v We could say that ~ pc
N is \in between" ~ pN and ~ v.
Finally, for sequence of markets in which z grows slower than at the rate
p
N, a similar
result to the previous proposition holds. The main dierence is that in this case we have
simple expressions for the asymptotic standard deviations.
























































var[~ pN   ~ v] is the largest among the asymptotic stan-
dard deviations.
5.2 Informationally trivial limit
Recall from Proposition 1 that if the number of informed speculators N grows at a slower
rate than noise trading z an informationally trivial limit obtains and prices converge to zero.
Let us study the convergence rates in this case.





















var[~ pN] / N=z(N).
Therefore, the strategic eect vanishes faster than the limit eect as in our central sce-
nario.
175.3 Summary table
Table 3 summarizes the strategic and limit eects for prices in our central scenario and the
cases considered in this section.
Limit price Limit eect Strategic eect
z  O(
p





N  o(z) and z  o(N) ~ v, fully revealing z=N 1=z
z / N ~ p1 1=
p
N 1=N
N  o(z) 0, informationally trivial N=z N2=3
z
Table 3: Summary of the strategic and limit eects for prices.
One can see that whenever
p
N  o(z) the strategic eect is dominated by the limit
eect in terms of the speed of convergence. In particular, this happens in our central scenario
(the case when z / N). When z  O(
p
N) the speed of convergence is the same for both
eects (1=
p
N), but the strategic eect is still dominated by the limit eect in terms of the
asymptotic variances.
6 Traders close to risk neutral
In this section we examine the limiting behavior of equilibria in the set-up of Section 3 when
traders are close to risk neutrality ( ! 0). For all of the markets var[~ v] =  1




var[~ z] = z. Allow traders to become informed by paying a fee F(z) > 0. Assume
that F(1)  0 is well dened.
Proposition 11. With a cost of acquiring information F(z) > 0, the asymptotic behavior
of the endogenous number of informed speculators as  ! 0 is as follows:
1. (lim!0 N(z)) / (z=F(z))2=3 in the strategic model; and
2. (lim!0 N
c(z)) = 0 in the competitive model.
For example, in the central case of constant returns to information acquisition, F() 
F > 0 we obtain lim!0 N(z) / (z)2=3 for z large, while lim!0 N
c(z) = 0. No traders
choose to become informed in the price-taking case because of their closeness to risk neutrality.
If they chose to become informed they would trade so aggressively that they would (almost)
reveal their private information and would make (close to) zero prots. This is an example of
the well-known informational eciency paradox described by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
In the strategic case the informed traders take into account the eect of their actions on
the price and therefore can restrict their trade. So the incentives to acquire information do
18not disappear as more traders decide to become informed. It is worth noting that in the
limit as  ! 0, unlike the risk-averse case, the number of informed traders grows less than
proportionally with the size of the market z. The reason is that risk neutrality implies
ercer competition among informed traders.
7 Monopolistic competition
We present here the \monopolistic competition" example of Kyle (1989), where the compet-
itive and the strategic equilibrium are far apart even in a large market.
Consider a sequence of markets with the \monopolistic competition" limit in Kyle (1989,
Section 9). At the Nth market there are N informed agents and for all of the markets
var[~ v] =  1
v is a xed constant. However, now var[~ en] =  1
e and Ne = E; where E
is a given constant. This means that, unlike in the previous sections, the total precision is
bounded and does not change with N. A given stock of private information E is divided
equally among N speculators. Thus, for large N each speculator's signal contains only a small
amount of information. It is convenient to dene an average error term ~ e  (1=N)
PN
n=1 ~ en.
Obviously, ~ e is normally distributed with zero mean and var[~ e] = (Ne) 1 =  1
E .
It is easy to see that if var[~ z] = 2
z grows with N and E is xed, then both the competitive
and the strategic equilibrium reach the informationally trivial limit and equilibrium prices
converge to zero.
Another interesting case appears when var[~ z] = 2
z is a xed constant. First, let us
demonstrate that if we endogenize the number of informed agents, by allowing any trader
to be informed by paying a xed amount F > 0; then the number of informed in both
the competitive and the strategic regime will be nite. (Note that we keep the noise trade
constant in this model, so F does not depend on z.)
Proposition 12. In the monopolistic competition model with a cost of F > 0 for becoming an
informed trader, the endogenous number of informed speculators is nite in both the strategic
and competitive cases. As F ! 0, both numbers tend to innity.
The result follows because the certainty equivalent of prots in both the strategic and
competitive cases tend to zero as N grows. Now we conrm that the limits of the competitive
and monopolistically competitive equilibria as F ! 0 are dierent, and that the convergence
to the respective limit equilibria is fast, at a rate of at least 1=N, in both cases. The dierence
in the limits is due to the residual market power traders enjoy in the monopolistic competition
case even in a large market. For the competitive model we show that the convergence is always
at a rate of 1=N, while for the monopolistically competitive model we can show that 1=N is
the exact rate of convergence for the subcase E > v. Convergence is fast now because all
along the sequence of markets, noise trade is constant and the average noise in the signal ~ e
19has constant variance. In contrast, in the central scenario we have that in the Nth market
var[~ e] is of the order of 1=N and this determines the convergence speed to the limit of 1=
p
N.
Proposition 13. For the sequence of markets with the monopolistic competition limit as
F ! 0, dierent prices are obtained in the price-taking (~ pc
1) and in the strategic case (~ p1)













var[~ pN   ~ p1]  O(1=N) and if E > v, then
p
var[~ pN   ~ p1] / 1=N.
8 Concluding remarks
The basic insight of the paper is that provided there is no residual market power in a large
market, competitive and strategic equilibria should be close whenever price-taking traders
have incentives to be restrained in their trading. This insight should be robust to dynamic
considerations. Think, for example, of the extreme case of risk neutral traders. Then the
same logic as in the static model would lead us to conclude that competitive traders in a
multiperiod market will have no incentives to acquire information, since prots would be
dissipated, while strategic traders would. In any case, an interesing extension of the model
would be to consider multiperiod trading.
9 Appendix
9.1 Characterization of the equilibria
For the convenience of the reader we summarize here some characterization results from
Kyle (1989). Note that our restriction of the competitive risk-neutral market making sector
corresponds to the free entry of uninformed speculators (M = 1) in Kyle (1989).
For any symmetric linear equilibrium with the strategies Xn = +in p; n = 1;:::;N,
we can solve the market clearing condition for the equilibrium price ~ p. Then we obtain
the result that ~ p is informationally equivalent to (
PN
n=1 Xn(~ p;~ {n) + ~ z) and therefore to
(
PN
n=1~ {n + ~ z). Thus we can express the price in terms of the parameter :















~ vN + 
N X
n=1






v N2 + 2 1
e N + 2
z

~ vN + 
N X
n=1
~ en + ~ z

: (1)
20Regardless of the particular equilibrium concept, the linearity and symmetry assumptions
allow useful measures of the informativeness of prices to be obtained. Dene F as the
precision of the forecast of the liquidation value ~ v based on all the information, that is
F = var 1 [~ v j ~ {1;:::;~ {N]. The assumptions made on the distributions of ~ v; ~ e1;:::; ~ eN imply
that F = v + Ne. Now let us dene the precision U that speculators have basing only on
the price and the precision I that speculators have basing on the price and their own private
signal:
U = var 1 [~ v j ~ p] and I = var 1 [~ v j ~ p;~ {n]:
Normality makes U and I constants, while symmetry means that I does not depend on
n. Since these precisions are bounded below by the prior precision v; and above by the
full-information precision F; there exist constants 'U and 'I both in the interval [0,1], such
that
U = v + 'UNe and I = v + e + 'I(N   1)e:
The parameters 'U and 'I are convenient indices measuring the \informational eciency"
with which price aggregate private information of informed traders. Theorem 4.1 in Kyle
(1989) presents expressions for these indices in terms of the parameter :
'I =
(N   1)2








'U   'I =
1
N
'U(1   'I): (3)
Let us turn back now to the two specic equilibria that we are studying. From (1) we





v N2 + (c)2 1
e N + 2
z

c~ vN + c
N X
n=1







v N2 + 2 1
e N + 2
z

~ vN + 
N X
n=1




The only dierence in the expressions for prices is the dierence between the parameters 













21where  = I=e  1=2, and
(1   ) = (1   I)(1   'I) and 0  I  1=N; (6)
where I =  can be interpreted as the marginal market share of an informed speculator.
Condition (64) in Kyle (1989) will be true for  in our case:
U   'UI = 0: (7)
Finally, the following characterization (Lemma 7.1 of Kyle (1989)) of 'I and 'c
I in the corre-





















(1   I)2 : (8)
9.2 Limit marginal market shares
One conclusion in Theorem 9.2 in Kyle (1989) requires some qualication for the case of free
entry of uninformed speculators. Theorem 9.2 in Kyle (1989) covers the case where the limit
is of the Hellwig{Admati type (as in Proposition 2) and concludes that UM ! 0, which
is equivalent to IN ! 1. However, if we restrict attention to the case of a competitive
risk-neutral market making sector or free entry of uninformed speculators (M = 1), then










Note that parameters U and I can be interpreted respectively as marginal market shares of
an uninformed speculator and of an informed speculator. Thus, the total marginal market
share of all informed speculators (IN) even in the limit is strictly less than one, and it is
close to one only if the precision of their signals (e) is large relative to the other parameters
of the model.
Similarly, Theorem 9.1 in Kyle (1989) predicts for the case of monopolistic competition
that IN ! 1. Again, for M = 1 this does not hold. Lemma 5 below proves that in our case
with a competitive risk-neutral market making sector, or free entry of uninformed speculators





Since limN!1 'U < 1, we can conclude that the total marginal market share of all
22informed speculators (IN) even in the limit is strictly less than one.
9.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 The proof proceeds in three steps. We deal in some detail with the
case of the competitive equilibrium. The case of the strategic equilibrium follows similarly.
Step 1. Let us start with an exogenously given number of informed speculators N > 0 and
let us compare c(N) and F. Kyle (1989, Theorem 10.1) provides the following expression





































Since (1   'c
I)(1   'c
U) 6 1 and 1 + 'c
UNe 1
v > 1 we have that 0 6 c(z;N) 6 e=v and,
therefore,










Step 2. Now let us consider various cases of possible growth of z and N and their eect on
c(N):
Case 1. If N grows slower than at the rate 2
z; then the left-hand side of characterization
(8) increases at a rate of 2
z=N. Therefore, the right-hand side of characterization (8) also
increases at a rate of 2
z=N. However, this is only possible if 'c
I converges to zero at a rate
of N=2
z. Then it follows from (3) that 'c
U also converges to zero. Moreover, then the same
condition (3) implies that 'c
U converges to zero also at a rate of N=2
z. The following subcases
of this case should be separated.
Subcase (a) of case 1). If N grows slower than at the rate z; then we have that c
U =
v+'c
UNe converges to v. So, the limit model is informationally trivial. Moreover c(z;N)
converges to e=v and c(N) converges to F.
Subcase (b) of case 1). If N grows at the same rate as z, that is z / N, then it follows
from (8) that 'c
I / N 1. This implies from (3) that 'c
U / N 1. Hence, there exist positive
constants k1 and k2 such that k1 6 'c
UN 6 k2 for all large N. Therefore, there exist con-
stants c1 and c2 such that 0 < c1 6 c(z;N) 6 c2 < e=v for all large N. Thus, there exist
23constants F1 and F2 such that 0 < F1 6 c(N) 6 F2 < F for all large N. In this case it is
not possible that c(N) converges to zero or F. Note that c(N) would converge to some
constant F0; 0 < F0 < F and the limit model will be well dened if z=N converges to some
positive number. (If z=N converges to some positive number, then by (8) 'c
IN converges
to some positive number. So, by (3), 'c
UN converges to the same positive number as 'c
IN.
Then c(z;N) converges to some constant c0; 0 < c0 < e=v. Hence, c(N) would also
converge to some constant F0; 0 < F0 < F.) If the limit model is well dened, the limit will
be neither value revealing nor informationally trivial.
Subcase (c) of case 1). Now let us consider the case that N grows faster than at the rate
z, but slower than at the rate 2
z. Then c
U = v + 'c
UNe increases to innity at the rate
N2=2
z. Therefore, c(z;N) and c(N) converge to zero. The limit will be value revealing.
(Recall that E[~ v j ~ pc
N] = ~ pc
N. This implies that var[~ v   ~ pc




Case 2. If N grows at a rate 2
z or faster, then the left-hand side of characterization (8)
is bounded by some number. Therefore, the right-hand side of characterization (8) is also
bounded by this number. Therefore, 'c
I does not converge to zero. Then it follows from (3)
that 'c
U also does not converge to zero. Since 'c
U 6 1 we get that (c
U)N = v + 'c
UNe in-
creases to innity at the rate N. Therefore c(z;N) and c(N) converge to zero. The
limit will be value revealing. (Recall again that E[~ v j ~ pc
N] = ~ pc
N. This implies that
var[~ v   ~ pc
N] = var[~ v j ~ pc
N] = (c
U) 1 and thus converges to zero.)
Summarizing all of the cases: c(N) converges to F if N grows slower than at the
rate z (note that this covers the case when N does not grow at all), case 1(a) above;
0 < F1 6 c(N) 6 F2 < F for all large N if N grows at the same rate as z, case 1(b)
above; and c(N) converges to zero if N grows faster than at the rate z, cases 1(c) and 2
above. Moreover, note that N and N + 1 always grow at the same rate with respect to
z ! 1 and none of the limits above change with a substitution of N +1 in place of N. We
can thus conclude that c(N + 1) always converges to the same limit as c(N).
Step 3. Now let us turn to the endogenously determined number of informed speculators
N
c(z). Recall that it is dened so that
c(N
c(z))  F(z) > c(N
c(z) + 1):
Thus, as in Step 2, c(N
c(z)) and c(N
c(z) + 1) should converge to the same limit. For
F(1)  F we can conclude that c(N
c(z)) ! F(1). For F(1) > F we must have
24N
c(z) = 0 for all large z. Three cases are now possible.
(I) If F(1)  F; then either F(1) > F and N
c(z) = 0 for all large z or F(1) = F
and by the exclusion of cases 1(b), 1(c) and 2 we must be in the case 1(a) above. In
either variant N
c(z)  o(z) and the limit market is informationally trivial. (Note that
if F()  F > 0, N > 0 speculators can chose to become informed only if c(N) > F.
For F > F this is not possible since c(N) never exceeds F for any N. For F = F
this would require 'c
I = 'c
U = 0. Then by (5) it will imply that c = e=. However,
then our assumption that N > 0 makes the second formula of (2) impossible to hold.
A contradiction. Hence, N
c(z) = 0.)
(II) If 0 < F(1) < F, then by the exclusion of cases 1(a), 1(c) and 2 only the case 1(b)
above is possible. Therefore, N
c(z) / z and both 'c
I and 'c
U converge to zero.
Moreover, since c(N














we have that c
U ! e=(exp(2F(1))   1). Therefore, since c




c(z) ! 1=(exp(2F(1))   1)   v=e. Then by (3) 'c
IN
c(z) !









1=(exp(2F(1))   1)   v=e
:
So, the limit market is well dened and is neither value revealing nor informationally
trivial.
(III) If F(1) = 0, then by the exclusion of cases 1(a) and 1(b) only cases 1(c) or 2 above
are possible. Therefore, z  o(N
c(z)) and the limit market is value revealing. (Note
that if F()  F = 0, then obviously N
c(z) = 1.)
Now let us briey consider the case of the strategic equilibrium. The proof in this case goes
along the same lines as in the competitive case. Kyle (1989, Theorem 10.1) provides the













We can similarly dene
(z;N) 
(1   'I)(1   'U)e
U
(1   2)
(1   )2 =








Since (1 'I)(1 'U) 6 1, (1 2) 6 (1 )2 and 1+'UNe 1
v > 1, we have 0 6 (N) 6 F
25for any N. Then an analysis analogous to steps 1{3 above completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2 From the formulas (4) we obtain the following expressions for












































The expression for the limiting price in this model is also well known (e.g. Vives (1995);












Let us prove rst two lemmas.
Lemma 1. We have N / ('c
I)N / ('I)N / 1=N and ('I)N   ('c
I)N / 1=N2.
Proof. The (equal) left-hand sides of (8) grow at the rate N. Thus, the right-hand sides of
both expressions should grow at the rate N. Since (I)N  1=N (see (6)), this implies that
('c
I)N / 1=N; and ('I)N / 1=N. Since (1 ) = (1 I)(1 'I) (see (6)), we have  / 1=N.



















(1   )2   1:
Then
(1   2)2
(1   )2   1 =
(2   3)






















(1   'I)3   1

/ N('I   'c
I) + O('I   'c
I) / N('I   'c
I):
Hence, ('I)N   ('c
I)N / 1=N2.
Lemma 2. We have (c
N   1) / (N   1) / (N   c
N) / 1=N.























1   (1   'I)
(1   2)
(1   )
= 1   (1   'I) + (1   'I)

(1   )




















Thus N   c
N / 1=N.















Then from (9) we obtain
~ pN   ~ pc




































v + (N   c
N) 1
v 2
z0) = O(1=N). So
var[~ pN   ~ pc
N] = a2 1





Then from (9) and (10) we obtain
~ pc














































e ) = O(1=N).
27Finally, g converges to the constant. Thus,
var[~ pc
N   ~ p1] = f2 1





Proof of Proposition 3 We follow the notation from the proof of Proposition 2.

















Then limN!1 Mc = M1 = 2
1 1
v + 2
z0 and limN!1 c



















2. It follows from the proof of Proposition 2 that
lim
N!1













































































































since by Lemma 1 ('I   'c





















However, from (6) we have that  = I + 'I   I'I. Since I  1
N and 'I / 1=N we get
limN!1 I'IN = 0. Thus, limN!1 N = limN!1 IN + limN!1 'IN. By Lemma 1
'I   'c
I / 1=N2 and, therefore, limN!1 'IN = limN!1 'c


























As we mentioned above, one conclusion in Theorem 9.2 in Kyle (1989) actually requires a
correction. Theorem 9.2 in Kyle (1989) states that limN!1 UM = 0 which is equivalent to
limN!1 IN = 1. The following lemma corrects that statement.




























































































































































Proof of Proposition 4 In a symmetric linear equilibrium the demands have the form:
~ xN(~ p;~ {n) = N +N~ {n N ~ pN; ~ xc




N and ~ x1(~ p;~ {n) = 1+1~ {n 
1~ p1. Kyle (1989, proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 6.1) shows that c
N = N = 0. Hence, 1 = 0
as well. Recall that we showed in Lemma 2 that (c
N  1) / (N  1) / (N  c
N) / 1=N.
Now let us prove an analogous result for N; c
N and 1.
Lemma 4. We have 1 6= 0, c
N 1 = O(1=N); N 1 = O(1=N) and N c
N = O(1=N).
















= 1   I:
Corollary 4.1 in Kyle (1989) implies that in our case with the competitive market makers





































Then since (I)N = (I)1 + O(1=N); (U)N = (U)1 + O(1=N); 'I = O(1=N); and I =
=(1   I) = O() + O(1=N) = O('U) + O(1=N) = O(1=N), we obtain that 1 6= 0;
c
N   1 = O(1=N) and N   1 = O(1=N). Then, also, N   c
N = O(1=N).










~ en + Cc
N~ z0;





~ en + CN~ z0;
~ p1 = A1~ v + C1~ z0:
It follows from the proof of Proposition 1 that Ac
N and AN converge to A1; Bc
N and BN
converge to B1 6= 0 and Cc
N and CN converge to C1. All of these convergencies also happen
at a rate of 1=N or faster. Then
~ xc





























(N   NAN), Db = (c
N   c
NBc
N(1=N))   (N   NBN(1=N)), Dc = c
NBc
N   NBN and
Dd = c
NCc
N   NCN. Then we obtain
E[(~ xc











It is immediate that Da = O(1=N), Dc = O(1=N), Dd = O(1=N), while
Db = (c














N(~ p;~ {n)   ~ xN(~ p;~ {n))2] / 1=N2:
31Now let us note that
~ x1(~ p;~ {n) = 1~ {n   1~ p1 = (1   1A1)~ v + 1~ en   1C1~ z0:
So if we dene Ka = (c
N   c
NAc






N and Kd = c
NCc
N   1C1, then we obtain
E[(~ xc











It is immediate that Ka = O(1=N), Kb = O(1=N), Kd = O(1=N), while Kc = c
NBc
N
converges to 1B1 6= 0. Hence,
E[(~ xc
N(~ p;~ {n)   ~ x1(~ p;~ {n))2] / 1=N:
Proof of Proposition 5 First for simplicity of notation let us again rewrite the expression
for prices (9) as in the proof of Proposition 4:
~ pc
N = Ac






~ ek + Cc
N~ z0;





~ ek + CN~ z0:
Then, also as in the proof of Proposition 4, let us obtain an expression for ~ xc
N(~ p;~ {n):
~ xc



















~ ek   c
NCc
N~ z0:
Note that the expression for ~ xN(~ p;~ {n) is just similar (with no superscripts of c). That
allows us to obtain an explicit expression for ~ c
n(~ p;~ {n) = (~ v   ~ pc
N)~ xc
N(~ p;~ {n) as a function
of ~ v; ~ e1;:::; ~ eN; ~ z0. Note that the expression for ~ n is again dierent only in the absence
of the superscript c. Actually the dierence between any corresponding coecients in ~ n
and ~ c
n will be of the order O(1=N). So all of the coecients in (~ n   ~ c
n) will be of the
order of O(1=N). Moreover (~ n  ~ c
n) will be a homogenous polynomial of the second degree.
Hence, we obtain that (~ N   ~ c
N)2 is a homogenous polynomial of the forth degree. Since
~ v; ~ e1;:::; ~ eN; ~ z0 are all independent with zero expectations, in E[(~ N   ~ c
N)2] only all of the
fourths moments and all products of the second moments of ~ v; ~ e1;:::; ~ eN; ~ z0 will be nonzero.
It is easy to notice that all of the coecients in this expression will be of the order of
O(1=N)O(1=N) = O(1=N2). Therefore,
E[(~ N   ~ c
N)2] = O(1=N2):
32To show that the rate of convergence is exactly 1=N2 we need to be much more specic
when describing E[(~ N   ~ c
N)2]. For some coecients Lv, Lz, Lvz, Lvn, Lkn, Lnz, where
1  k;m  N, we can write
~ N(~ p;~ {n)   ~ c









Lvk~ v~ ek + Lvz~ v~ z0 +
X
k6=m






Note that all of the coecients Lv, Lz, Lvz, Lvn, Lkm, Lkz, where 1  k;m  N are of the
order O(1=N). Since only the fourths moments and all products of the second moments of
~ v; ~ e1;:::; ~ eN; ~ z0 will be nonzero in E[(~ N   ~ c
N)2], we obtain that
E[(~ N(~ p;~ {n)   ~ c































Since all parts of this expression are positive and of the order of O(1=N2), it is enough
to demonstrate that one part is actually of the order of 1=N2 to conclude that the entire
















































=  (CNN   Cc
Nc
N) + O(1=N2):
Inspection of (9) shows that CNN = AN and Cc
Nc
N = Ac
N, while in the proof of Proposi-
tion 1 we demonstrated that (AN Ac






1=N. Therefore, Lnz / 1=N. Hence L2
nz / 1=N2 and
E[(~ N(~ p;~ {n)   ~ c
N(~ p;~ {n))2] / L2
nz / 1=N2:
This nishes the proof for the strategic eect. Now let us examine the limit eect. The proof
33is more straightforward. Recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that
~ x1(~ p;~ {n) = (1   1A1)~ v + 1~ en   1C1~ z0 and
(~ v   ~ p1) = (1   A1)~ v   C1~ z0;
while
~ xc
N(~ p;~ {n) = (c
N   c
NAc













~ ek   c
NCc
N~ z0 and
(~ v   ~ pc
N) = (1   Ac










~ ek   Cc
N~ z0:
By the same argument as the above for the strategic eect, in E[(~ c
n   ~ 1)2] only all of the
fourth moments and all products of the second moments of ~ v; ~ e1;:::; ~ eN; ~ z0 will be nonzero.
Similarly to the case of strategic eect, all coecients will converge to zero at a rate of
O(1=N2) except for the parts where some moments of ~ ek, k 6= n are included. (Note that
for the rates of convergence we can ignore parts associated with ~ en and not some other ~ ek,
k 6= n.) Hence the only parts of E[(~ c
n   ~ 1)2] that have to be examined closely involve
moments of ~ ek, k 6= n. So we have to concentrate on the following remaining dierence
between ~ c






















(~ v   ~ pc
N):











N(~ p;~ {n) + c
N(~ v   ~ pc
N)):
Substituting expressions for ~ xc
N(~ p;~ {n) and (~ v  ~ pc
N) let us exclude parts that will be O(1=N2)
once E[(~ c
n   ~ 1)2] is computed. Then we obtain the following remaining dierence between
~ c





















~ en   c
NCc
N~ z0 + c
N(1   Ac



























































Since B1 6= 0, C1 6= 0, 1 6= 0 and 1 6= 0, it is immediate that both of the last two parts
are nonzero, hence
E[(~ c
n(~ p;~ {n)   ~ 1(~ p;~ {n))2] / 1=N:
Proof of Proposition 6 First, note that using the full Taylor expansion for the exponential
function we obtain, for two prot levels a and b, that

























Now for the strategic eect the argument is straightforward. Recall from the proof of Propo-
sition 5 that all of the coecients in (~ n   ~ c
n) will be of the order of O(1=N). Therefore, all
of the coecients in E[(~ N   ~ c
N)k] will be of the order of O(1=Nk); while we have proved in
Proposition 5 that E[(~ N   ~ c
N)2] / 1=N2. Thus,
E[(U(~ N)=U(~ c
N)   1)2] / E[(U(~ c
N)=U(~ N)   1)2] / 1=N2:
For the limit eect the argument is similar. Recall that in the proof of Proposition 5 we
have showed that all of the coecients in (~ c
n   ~ 1) are similar to those in (~ n   ~ c
n) with
the exception of those related to ~ ek, k 6= n. The straightforward inspection of this dierence
reveals that nevertheless
P1
k=3 kkE[(b a)k] will be of the order O(1=N2); while we have
proved in Proposition 5 that E[(~ c
n   ~ 1)2] / 1=N. Thus,
E[(U(~ c
N)=U(~ 1)   1)2] / E[(U(~ 1)=U(~ c
N)   1)2] / 1=N:
35Finally, for E[(U(~ N)=U(~ 1) 1)2] the argument is exactly the same as it is for E[(U(~ c
N)=U(~ 1) 
1)2].
Proof of Proposition 7 Note rst, that the parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 7 and the fact
that 'c
I; 'I; 'c
U; and 'U converge to zero at the rate N=2
z(N) were proved in the proof of
Proposition 1. Thus, we only need to prove part 1. The proof proceeds in the similar way to
the proof of Proposition 2. Since (1   ) = (1   I)(1   'I) and 0  I  1=N (see (6)), we
have N / N=2





































I ('I   'c







Hence, ('I)N   ('c
I)N / N2=4
z(N). Then N and c




















Thus, N   c
N / N=2
z(N). Now let ~ z0 := ~ z(N)=N. Then 2
z0 := var[~ z0] = 2
z(N)=N2. Now











z0. Then as in the proof of Proposition 2 we obtain
~ pN   ~ pc












































So b / (N   c
N) / N=2
z(N). Thus,
var[~ pN   ~ pc
N] = a2 1





















36Proof of Proposition 8 Let ~ z0 := ~ z(N)=N. Then 2










































Then the (equal) left-hand sides of (8) converge to a non-zero constant as N grows. Thus, the
right-hand sides also should converge to a non-zero constant. Hence, 'c
I and 'I converge to
two dierent constants, say ('c
I)1 and ('I)1. Then (8) implies that ('c
I)1 > ('I)1. (This
is also a conclusion of Theorem 7.1 in Kyle (1989).) Moreover, (1 'c
I), (1 'I) and (1 2)
do not converge to zero. Therefore, it follows from (5) that c
N and N also converge to some















N2 / (N   c
N):
Thus, (N   c
N) also converge to a non-zero constant. Direct computation shows that
var[~ pc





















































































































37converge to one. Hence,
var[~ pc











































Expressions (5) and (8) imply that N(2
z0=(c





z0=(N)2) converges to  1













I)1 > ('I)1. Hence, x > xc. Then
var[~ pc
N   ~ v] =  1










var[~ pN   ~ v] =  1









var[~ pN   ~ pc
N] =  1








Since 1 + x2 > 1 + x2
c and 1 + x2 > x2 > (x   xc)2, the proposition is proved.
Proof of Proposition 9 Let ~ z0 := ~ z(N)=N. Then 2











































Then an analysis of (8) very similar to that in the proof of Proposition 8 shows that 'c
I
converge to one at a rate of (2
z(N)=N)1=3; and that 'I and  converge to 1=2 at a rate of
(2
z(N)=N)1=2. (Since   1=2, by (6) we obtain that 'I and  converge to 1=2.) Then
from (5) we obtain that c
N / (2
z(N)=N)1=3 and N / (2





z(N)=N)1=3(1=N) = o(1=N) and 2
z0=2
N / 1=N.
38Direct computation shows that
var[~ pc





































































N)2))) converges to one, while (5) and (8) imply
that N(2
z0=(N)2) converges to  1
e . This proves the conclusions of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 10 If N grows at a slower rate than z, then from the characterization
(8) we obtain that 'c
I and 'I converge to zero at a rate of N=2
z Then it follows from (3)
that 'c
U and 'U also converge to zero at a rate of N=2
z. Hence, c
U = v + 'c
UNe and
U = v+'UNe converge to v, while c
I and I converge to v+e. Then from (7) we obtain
that  converges to zero at a rate of N=2





































I ('I   'c







Hence, ('I)N   ('c
I)N / N2=4
z(N). Then N and c




















Thus, N   c
N / N=2
z(N). Let us dene ~ z0 := ~ z(N)=N. Then 2
z0 := var[~ z0] = 2
z(N)=N2











z0. Note that Mc / M / 2
z0. Then, as in the proof of
Proposition 2, we obtain
~ pN   ~ pc













































var[~ pN   ~ pc
N] = a2 1



















This proves part 1 of the proposition. Inspection of expressions (9) shows that in the case
described in Proposition 10
var[~ pc















This proves parts 2 and 3 of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 11 Let us start with an exogenously given number of informed
speculators N. Expressions (8) and (6) imply, for  converging zero, that 'c
I ! 1, 'I ! 1=2
and  ! 1=2. Then, by (3), 'c
U ! 1 and 'U ! 1=2. Moreover, both 'c
I ! 1 and 'c
U ! 1
at a rate of 2=3. Applying L'H^ opital's rule to the expression for the certainty equivalents of













/ 1=3 ! 0 as  ! 0:
Therefore, N
c(z) = 0 for  ! 0. Expression (2) implies that N(N)2=(N(N)2 + 2
ze) =
'U ! 1=2 for  ! 0. Since z is xed for a given N, it follows that N(N)2 ! 2
ze for





for  ! 0:
Applying L'H^ opital's rule to the expression for the certainty equivalents of prots given by

















 0(N) as  ! 0:
We have that 0(N) ! 0 as N ! 1. We know that 0(N(z)) will be approximately equal
to F(z) (and the approximation will be good for z large). Therefore, lim!0 N(z) /
(z=F(z))2=3. The strategic equilibrium allows a direct analysis of the risk-neutral case.
40Moreover, by continuity the same results have to be obtained for  ! 0 and  = 0.
Proof of Proposition 12 As in the proof of Proposition 1, let us start with the exogenously
given number of informed speculators N. Kyle (1989, Theorem 10.1) provides the following


























Since Ne = E; the (equal) left-hand sides of (8) converge to a non-zero constant as N grows.
Thus, the right-hand sides also should converge to a non-zero constant. Thus, there exist two
dierent non-zero constants ('c
I)1 and ('I)1; such that ('c
I)N ! ('c
I)1 and ('I)N ! ('I)1
as N ! 1. Similarly, there exist ('c
U)1, ('U)1 and 1. Moreover, (1 ('c
I)1); (1 ('I)1);
(1   ('c
U)1); (1   ('U)1) and (1   21) are all non-zero constants. Therefore, since c
U and
U are bounded, both c(N) and (N) converge to zero. This implies the conclusions of the
proposition.
Let us state a lemma before proving Proposition 13.





Proof. Condition (B.22) in Kyle (1989) states that





)v   'U(1   NI)e

:
Since the left-hand side of this expression is zero by (7) and 'I < 1, we should obtain
(I 'U=N)v  'U(1 NI)e = 0. Therefore, (NI 'U)v  'U(1 NI)E = 0. However,
this is equivalent to NI(v+'UE) = 'U(v+E). Thus NI = ('U(v+E))=(v+'UE) =
(v + E)=((v='U) + E).
Proof of Proposition 13 From formulas (4) we obtain the following expressions for prices
































The proof proceeds in four steps. (1) Let us prove that there exist dierent non-zero constants

















(~ v + ~ e + d~ z):
This will imply that ~ pc
1 6= ~ p1. As in the proof of Proposition 12, there exist two dierent
non-zero constants ('c
I)1 and ('I)1; such that ('c
I)N ! ('c
I)1 and ('I)N ! ('I)1 as
N ! 1. Moreover (1 ('c
I)1); (1 ('I)1) and (1 21) are all non-zero constants. Thus,
it follows from (5) that there exist non-zero constants d and dc such that 1=c
NN ! dc and
















/ (NN   c
NN):
Since ('c
I)1 6= ('I)1; we have that d 6= dc. (2) Now let us prove the statement of the






















NN)2   (dc)2 / 1=c
NN   dc. Since ~ pc
N = kc














































































  1 / 1=N:
































I)1 / 1=N and therefore var(~ pc
N   ~ pc
1) / 1=N2. (3) Now let us look at the
equilibrium with imperfect competition. In the same way as above













































(1   2N) + 2(1   N):
Then 2(1 N) = 2(('I)1 ('I)N) 2I(1 ('I)N). By Lemma 5, since 0 < limN!1 'U =











Now let us show that it is impossible to have the case where 1=N = o(('I)1   ('I)N). Let








(1   1)2 / ('I)1   ('I)N: (11)




(1   N)2 =
(1   ('I)N)(1   2('I)N)2
('I)N
+ O(1=N);




(1   1)2 =




(1   ('I)N)(1   2('I)N)2
('I)N
 





(1   8('I)N('I)1 + 4('I)N('I)1(('I)N + ('I)1))
However, limN!1(1   8('I)N('I)1 + 4('I)N('I)1(('I)N + ('I)1)) = 1   8(('I)1)2 +
8(('I)1)3 6= 0; since 0 < ('I)1 < 1
2. Therefore, (11) is proved. However, by (8), the left-hand
side of (11) must be of the order of 1=N. This proves that the case 1=N = o(('I)1   ('I)N)
is impossible. Therefore, ('I)1   ('I)N = O(1=N) and we obtain
p
























2 (1   ('I)N)2(1   2N)2













































+ ('I)N   ('I)1:










Let us assume that NN  1=d = o(1=N). Then we should have limN!1 N(('I)1 ('I)N) =
(1   ('I)1)('I)1 and limN!1 2N(('I)1   ('I)N) = limN!1 NI. By Lemma 5, NI =
(v + E)=((v='U) + E), therefore NN   1=d = o(1=N) implies an equality




44This equality holds only if




This condition can be rewritten as
E('U)2
1 + (v   E)('U)1 + (E   v)=2 = 0:
This equation on ('U)1 has a determinant of (v E)2 2(E v)E = 2
v  E
2. Therefore,
for the case of E > v, this equation does not have a solution and NN   1=d = o(1=N) is
impossible. Thus, we must have NN   1=d / 1=N for the case when E > v. Therefore,
p
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